Secrets and Lies


As the details of Austria's demand became known 3 1/2 weeks of drift came abruptly to an end. The possibility of war became increasingly real. Not only in Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburgh, but also in London, Rome, and Pairs. Awareness dawned that this was a genuinely dangerous crisis. Men with power where deciding the fate of Europe, the same men who brought war on and failed to do anything to keep war from happening. They told lies, made mistakes, and missed opportunities. With a few if any exceptions they were decent, well-intended men, and almost always they acted for what they thought were the best of reasons. But little of what they did produced the results they intended.


Saturday July 25th

The kingdom of Serbia, 48 hours almost to the minute after receiving Austria-Hungary's demands, presented its response. They agreed to only half of the 10 demands. The Austro-Hungarian ambassador to Serbia, Baron Giesl, followed his instructions to find this unacceptable and broke off diplomatic relations immediately, a 1/2 hour later he was on a train and crossing the Hungarian border.

Both countries announced that they were mobilizing. (Serbia had started mobilizing hour before delivering its response). Russia was not mobilizing, but they where doing what they call a Period Preparatory to War, in which they were calling all officers back to duty, and all army units who were on summer maneuvers had been called back. The military districts of Kazan, Kiev, Moscow, and Odessa were ordered to make ready. More secretly, preparations also began in the Warsaw, Vilna, and St. Petersburg districts. This last was particularly dangerous, as those 3 districts threatened Germany directly. But there was even more to July 25th then that.

The Serbian response to Austria's demands, far from being defiant, was actually conciliatory, respectful, and at times almost submissive in tone. It explained that while Serbia could agree unconditionally to a number of the demands, it had questions about several others-not objections, just questions-and could not accept one. The Royal Government said they couldn't accept the demand for Austria to be directly involved in Belgrade's search for and prosecution of the assassination plotters. They said it would be a violation of the constitution and the law of criminal procedure.

As positive as it was in many ways, and as clever as they thought it was to cooperate and hold off the Austrians, while impressing the rest of the world, was one of the mistakes that led to war. By declining to yield, the Serbs gave Berchtold, Conrad, and their cohorts the one thing they wanted: an excuse for military action. Worse, they did this unnecessarily. They might have responded differently-not more shrewdly, their document being nothing but shrewed, but more effectively-had they not been receiving reports about how Russia wanted them to stand firm. But these reports were wishful thinking on the part of Serbia's combative ambassador to Russia, who being manipulated by France's ambassador in St. Petersburg, Maurice Paleologue. They certainly were not in accord with the thinking of Russian officialdom. Tsar Nicholas was leery of a major war because he was fearful of its likely consequences-social and economic strains so severe that they could spark revolution. So was Foreign Minister Sazonov. Both men believed that Russia was years from being ready to fight a war with Germany. Even though Russia was greatly expanding its already huge army and they were also getting help from France in building new networks of railroads to help improve its ability to wage war, but none of this would be done until 1917.

But Sazonov believed that Austria-Hungary was not acting independently but as a tool of Berlin, he felt the Germans were determined to precipitate a preventive war, and that Russia could only protect itself be reacting forcefully and quickly.

The Serbian response might have also been different if someone other than Nikola Pasic had been responsible for preparing it. He had known of the Black Hand's plot to kill the Archduke and even tried to stop it. For this reason he did not want Austria-Hungary to become involved in any investigation dealing with the Archduke's death. He knew it would be bad for not only Serbia, but also for him, especially if Austria found out how much he knew about the Archduke's death, they would start asking questions and then the Black Hand would learn he knew about their plot and tried to stop it. He wanted nothing to get in the way of his re-election.

Now the Austria mobilization that followed, put into motion a plan for assembling 20,000 divisions-some 300,000 troops-just a few miles from Belgrade. In doing this Conrad left himself with only 28 divisions for Galicia to the North, where Austria-Hungary would have to face much larger numbers if Russia went to war. This alarmed the German General Staff. It meant Conrad was leaving the German army without any help in the east if Russia attacked. This showed Conrad's blind determination that Russia would not get involved and he could therefore give the Serbs the thrashing that he had been wanting to give them for years.

With Russia declaring Period Preparatory to War, was taking the necessary steps that would enable them to be able to mobilize their troops quickly. This involved the mustering of 1.1 million troops in the 4 districts nearest to Austria-Hungary.

The Serb's mobilization, which was very small, was based on the assumption that Austria was planning to attack within a few days. This same assumption prompted the Serbs to move their government out of Belgrade and away from the border.

Even though Russia was taking the steps to get their troops together, was not an easy task. They had to call up reserves which was hard because railways were few and far between and the men who reported for duty would have to travel hundreds of miles and then had to be assigned positions before preparing to face an enemy. Plus an invasion into enemy territory was not integral to Russia's mobilization arrangements; this was to be decided according to circumstances. Even after they mobilized, the Russian leadership would continue to have options. Russia would keep its armies on Russian soil without disruption of their ability to act.

Now the Austro-Hungarian Empire faced transport problems similar to, but not as serious as what Russia faced. And like St. Petersburg's, Vienna's mobilization plans gave it a measure of flexibility, Conrad divided his forces into 3 groups; for the use against Serbia, one for Galicia and engagement of the Russians, and the 3rd was to be deployed to either front depending on need. In his decision to send his 3rd division to the South, Conrad was able to assemble 20 divisions for an attack on Serbia.

Germany in 1914 the most modern and efficient of Europe's industrial giants, could mobilize with a speed that was dazzling by comparison with either Russia or Austria-Hungary. The survival of Germany depended on the speed. Ever since 1894, when France and Russia first became allies, Germany knew that going to war with one, meant going to war with both. Knowing that they could not win the war against both. Their mobilization objective was to knock France out of action before Russia could launch their attack. With this plan their first stop would be Paris. They knew once they started they couldn't stop. Just for Germany alone, mobilization equaled war.

But any kind of mobilization was dangerous. It was inherently threatening, and was certain to draw attention.

Austria-Hungary's mobilization, help to capture the Chief of the Serbian Army, the aged Field Marshall Radomir Putnik, he was on his way home from a summer vacation in the Austria Province of Bohemia. But Emperor Franz Joseph demanded that Putnik be allowed to proceed and return to Belgrade. An Old World Courtliness, that Conrad and his troops would have reason to regret their Emperor's chivalry.