Fear is a bad counselor


Wednesday July 29th


At 1 o'clock in the morning Tsar Nicholas sent a telegram to Kaiser Wilhelm and it expressed indegnation that an "ignoble war has been declared on a weak country". He asked the Kaiser "in the name of our old friendship to do what you can to stop your allies from going to far". While Nicholas's telegram was on its way to Wilhelm, Wilhelm sent a telegram of his own to the Tsar. Wilhelm signed it "your very sincere and devoted friend and cousin". In it the Kaiser declared his hopes for peace and said, " I am exerting my utmost influence to induce the Austrians to deal straightly to arrive to a satisfactory understanding with you. This exchange was promising, though in his marginal scribblings, the Kaiser dismissed Tsar Nicholas's message as "a confession of his own weakness, and an attempt to put the responsibility on my own shoulders".

In any case, like every glimmer of hope during this exhausting and interminable with, the exchange would soon be submerged in the rush of events. The Tsar's Foreign Minister, Sazonov, continued to be under intense pressure from all sides. He needed little persuading when, later in the morning, War Minister Vladimir Sukhomlinov and the army's Chief of State came to him with their solution to the crisis, mobilization. Mobilizing the army, they said, would put Austria-Hungary on notice in the strongest possible way. Not mobilizing, on the other hand, would leave the army unable to respond if Austria's troops entered Serbia. In case of a wider war, the army would be totally unprepared. Sazonov was quick to agree.

The Chief of Staff then took the train to Tsar Nicholas's summer palace(the Tsar, capable of a strange degree of detachment when terrible things were happening around him, had not visited the capital once since Franz Ferdinand's assassination) and got his signature on two decrees. One ordered the mobilization of 12 army corps, 55 divisions, in 4 military districts where secret preparations were already most advanced. This army was bigger than the Austro-Hungarian army, but it would include less than half of Russia's troops ans so was not intended as a threat to Germany.

The other decree would put in motion a general mobilization involving all districts including those nearest Germany and thereby drastically escalate the crisis. Nicholas believed he was merely putting in place the paperwork necessary for possible action later. he told his visitor that neither order was to be executed without specific authorization from him.

That night army headquarters were preparing for execution of the general mobilization-and Sazonov was telling lies to the British Ambassador, assuring him that Russia was considering no action that could possibly distress the Germans-when the Tsar sent word that he had made a decision. Only a partial mobilization, he said, would be allowed; There must be no move against Germany. Nicholas was continuing to exchange telegrams with the Kaiser, who was continuing to assure him-truthfully that he was trying to slow the Austrians down.

On this same day President Poincare of France and Prime Minister Viviani landed at Dunkirk and hurried to Paris by train. They were surprised to learn that Austria had declared war. And Poincare was surprised to see that people where gathered and cheering "To Berlin" and it was just not here this was happening, other capitals were having the same reactions. People eager for their countries to go to war. Across Europe socialist leaders were mustering their followers in opposition to the impending conflict. Even among the political and military elites, the mood was generally grim.

Sir Edward Grey, from his office at the Foreign Ministry, made his famous comment that "the lamps are going out all over Europe. We shall not see them lit again in our lifetime". (Ironically long before the wars end Grey would have to retire from public life because he was going blind). Even though Poincare was touched by his peoples reaction, he was determined to avert hostilities if possible.

Poincare and Viviani sent a telegram to St. Petersburg urging the Russians not to do anything that would provoke the Germans. But this telegram came to late, for Nicholas had done gave approval of a partial mobilization.

Now out of all the holders of high office, one man, young Winston Churchill was overly exited about the up coming war. "I think a curse should rest on me," he wrote to Prime Minister Asquth's wife, "because I love this war. I know it's smashing and shattering the lives of 1000's every moment-and yet- I can't help it-I enjoy every second of it". Churchill was still a little premature in writing of "this war".

As Wednesday ended, the outlook appeared to be slightly less dark, the likelihood of war diminishing if only slightly. The Kaiser and the Tsar were not only communicating but cooperating in an attempt to impose restraint.

Only 2 things now seemed necessary for a resolution of the crisis to remain possible. One Russia must refrain from general mobilization; the Kaiser seemed willing to accept, temporarily, limited Russian measures that did not threaten German directly. And Austria must agree to something akin to the Stop-in-Belgrade plan. The 2nd condition was likely to be met eventually, simply because Germany wanted it to happen; Austria would find it very hard to proceed without Berlin's support. It all came down, therefore, to the question of whether the Russians would mobilize and stampede the Germans into doing like wise.

Now the German military authorities remained divided. War Minister Erich von Falkenhayn, frightened by the dangers of allowing a Russian mobilization to go unanswered, was urging preliminary step towards mobilization. But for Chief of Staff Moltke(sometimes accused, unjustifiable, of having plotted from the start to provoke a preventive war), the greatest fear at this point was of doing anything that might cause the Russians to mobilize.

In a memorandum dated July 29th, he told Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg that if war came,"the leading nations of Europe would tear one another limb for limb... in a struggle that would destroy the culture of almost all of Europe for decades to come." Bethmann, who needed no persuading, sent an evening telegram instructing Ambassador Pourtales to "kindly impress upon Minister Sazonov very seriously that further progress of Russian mobilization measures would compel us to mobilize and that then European war could scarcely be prevented".