Friday July 31
When they learned of Russia's mobilization-unofficial reports reached Berlin almost immediately-the German generals intensified their demands. Because Germany continued to be the only European power not to have undertaken any military preparations at all, and the situation was becoming intolerable. Even Britain was on the move, First Lord of the Admiralty Chruchill having ordered the Grand Fleet to take up a position in the North Sea from which it could respond quickly to any forays by the German High Seas Fleet and protect France's channel ports.
So many holes were appearing in Germany's war plans. No one has foreseen a situation in which Russia mobilized without declaring war, or in which war erupted between Germany and Russia with France waiting on the sidelines. No one had a clue as what to do. The generals, of course-Chief of Staff Moltke included-were all but howling for action. The generals argued that Germany was in a better position to win a 2-front war now, than it would be after a few more years of French and Russia military buildup, and with every passing day of delay it was being drawn deeper into a death trap. The Kaiser refused mobilization, but agreed to declare a State of Impending War, which put in motion a variety of measures(securing borders, railways, and Germany's postal, telephone, and telegraph systems, and recalling soldiers on leave) in the expectation that mobilization would follow within 48 hours. He did this with the same deep reluctance shown by Franz Joseph when asked to declare war on Serbia, and by Tsar Nicholas when begged for mobilization. Like his fellow emperors, he yielded only because the military men, now taking charge in Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Vienna, were insisting that there was no alternative.
Bethmann too, desperately worried about keeping Britain out of any war and bringing Italy in on the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary, agreed only when, minutes before noon, the earlier reports of Russia's mobilization were confirmed.
Berlin continued to ask Vienna to demonstrate some willingness to negotiate on the basis of various proposals being offered by London and St. Petersburg(such proposals had become numerous and complex), but Berchtold maintained his silence. Short-circuiting diplomatic channels, Kaiser sent a telegram directly to Franz Joseph, requesting his intervention. After conferring with Berchtold and Conrad, the Hapsburg Emperor replied that Vienna could not do more than it had already done. He didn't bother to explain that Austria-Hungary too was now caught in the snares of its own military planning. Just as Russia had been unable to limit its mobilization to Austria because(as the generals claimed) it had no plan that would permit it to do so, and just as Germany had no way of mobilizing without attacking its neighbors, Austria had no plan that would send its army into Belgrade but no farther.
But Conrad feared, as the Russian generals had feared before their mobilization and as Germany's generals would soon be fearing with equally fateful consequences, that attempting to change his arrangements could lead only to disorder. Vienna couldn't regard this as a tolerable option with Serbia mobilizing and the Russians assembling immense forces along their common border.
But Conrad was not in touch with reality. Even as war with Russia became likely, he remained obsessed with punishing Serbia. Just as foolishly, he clung to the delusion that Italy would be entering the war on the side of the Central Powers, providing hundreds of 1,000's of additional troops.
All options except the military ones were shutting down. Power was moving into the hands of the soldiers and away from the diplomats and politicians. The soldiers were motivated mainly by fear. And as the Austrian Ambassador to France had observed on Thursday in a message to Berchtold, "Fear is a bad counselor."
In a display of German diplomacy at it ham-handed worst, Berlin informed London that if Britain remained neutral, Germany would promise to restore the borders of both France and Belgium(though not any overseas colonies that Germany might seize at the end of whatever war might ensue), this was ominous-no one had even mentioned Belgium until now.
Grey saw the offer as nothing better than a crude attempt at bribery, an insult to be rejected out of hand. his anger is transparent in his instructions to the British Ambassador in Berlin. "You must inform the German Chancellor that his proposal that we should bind ourselves to neutrality on such terms can not for a moment be entertained. He asks us in effect to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies. From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France could be crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to Germany policy without further territory in Europe being taken from her. But apart from that, for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France would be a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover."
To this warning he added assurances that German assistance in averting war would be rewarded. "If the peace of Europe can be preserved and this crisis be safely passed," he said "my own effort would be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no hostile or aggressive policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately."
He appeared to be pointing toward fundamental changes in the overall system of European alliances, changes calculated to make this the last crisis of its kind. The implication was that until now Grey hadn't understood the intensity of Germany's fear of encirclement, but that his eyes had been opened.
Grey than took the next step that would give Bethmann much reason to regret having broached the question of Belgium. With the approval of the cabinet, he asked France and Germany to declare their intention to respect Belgian's neutrality in case of war. France was able to agree without difficulty. France's plan for an offensive against Germany were focused far to the south of Belgium in the area of Alsace-Lorriane, and Poincare understood that British support in case of war would be infinitely more valuable than any possible use of Belgium territory.
Germany, trapped by the inflexibility of its mobilization plan, was unable to respond at all. Thus was the 1st major step taken toward Britain's entry into the war. Germany now sent what would become known as its double ultimatum to France and Russia. This message warning that German mobilization "must follow in case Russia does not suspend every war measure against Austria-Hungary and ourselves withing 12 hours." France was asked for a declaration of neutrality. The deadline for responses was Saturday afternoon.
The double ultimatum was in part Berlin's desperate final effort to escape mobilization and in part effort to precipitate a breakdown in diplomatic relations to help justify the westward invasion that must follow mobilization. As directed to Russia, it was a straightforward request for cooperation. As directed to France, it was a kind of wild theatrical gesture aimed at making clear to the world that if war with Russia came, Germany and France would be at war also. It was intended to explain, in the court of public opinion, a German attack on France.
But what it really looked like was overbearing German bluster. The likelihood that Berlin never expected Paris to accept it is supported by the outrageous additional demand that the German Ambassador to France was instructed to make in case of acceptance; France's temporary surrender of its great fortress at Verdun and Toul, in return for a promise that they would be returned at the end of Germany's fight with Russia.
Now came the final flurry of Nicholas's-Kaiser's telegrams. The Kaiser told the Tsar that he was continuing to try to mediate in Vienna, and that "the peace of Europe may still be maintained by you, if Russia will agree to stop the military measures which must threaten Germany and Austria-Hungary."
Once again, messages between the two emperors crossed in Midair. Nicholas told Kaiser that it was "technically impossible" to stop Russia's mobilization but that Russia did not want war and still did not see war as unavoidable. "So long as the negotiations with Austria on Serbia's account are taking place, my troops shall not take any provocative action. I give you my solemn word for this. I put all my trust in God's mercy and hope in your successful mediation in Vienna for the welfare of our countries and for the peace of Europe."
As soon as the Kaiser's message reached the Tsar, Nicholas sent back an answer. He said he understood that Russian mobilization might require Germany to mobilize as well. He said he accepted this, but it need not mean war. He asked the Kaiser for "the same guarantee from you as I gave you, that these measures do not mean war and that we shall continue negotiating for the benefit of our countries and universal peace dear to all our hearts. Our long proved friendship must succeed, with God's help, in avoiding bloodshed. Anxiously, full confidence await you answer."
It was obviously heartfelt and must have seemed the richest of opportunities. But nothing would come of it. Because of all that had already happened, nothing could.
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