Saturday, August 17, 2013

Count Istvan Tisza (1861-1918)

Served as Hungarian Prime Minister from the wars inception until his ousting in May of 1917 with the accession of Karl I as Emperor in place of the ageing Franz Joseph.

Himself the son of a Prime Minister, Tisza first came to power as head of the Liberal Party from 1903-1905. Re-appointed premier in 1913 for a second time, Tisza was a tireless campaigner for the recognition of Hungarian rights within the Dual Monarch.

Tisza was well aware of the dangers that war posed to the Austro-Hungarian empire. Noting that Slavs already outnumbered Magyars, Tiszar was fearful of the nationalist effects a war would engender among the empire's invariably discontented Slav people.

He also understood that even a successful war came with its own set of dangers. He was at pains to avoid the possibility that Serbia could find itself annexed by a victorious Austria-Hungary, thus perhaps creating a Triple Monarchy with yet more Slavs among its population.

Consequently Tisza acted as the dove in the Austro-Hungarian government during the crisis of July 1914, resstraining the more impetuous Imperial Foreign Minister Berchtold and Chief of Staff Conrad from launching a pre-emptive strike at Serbia in early July(without even a declaration of war beforehand). Both Berchtold and Conrad were keen to achieve a final settlement with Serbia at the point of a gun.

Tisza's insistence that all diplomatic avenues be explored before a military solution settled upon, did however rob Austria-Hungary of the element of surprise during the early phase of the war.

Nevertheless, once war was finally declared on July 28th, 1914, Tisza threw his whole weight behind the Austro-Hungarian war effort. He remained nonetheless as keen as ever to ensure that Hungary was not treated as the junior partner in the prosecution of the combined war effort. In practical terms this required that Tisza exercise a degree of blackmail over Vienna(which was certainly not lost upon Vienna).

For example he halted the free passage of food from Hungary to Austria in the spring of 1915- placing local needs above that of the empire(1914 had seen a poor harvest)- and declined to join a Joint Food Committee until February 1917.

In short, Tisza used the threat of withdrawing food supplies as a method of securing Hungarian influence at Imperial level. Reigning at home in what amounted to a dictatorial manner, Tisza nevertheless took care to retain the Magyar parliament in session. The parliament had little actual sway over policy, but Tisza could still point to it as legitimising his government, a point of more political value in Vienna than in Hungary.

In terms of funding the war effort Tisza gambled upon a short war. By declining to raise new taxes or to increase existing levels of taxation, he was staking all on winning the war: he would then ensure the defeated nations paid back the loans he had secured to fund the war. Short-sighted as this policy seems it yet ensured that Magyar support for the remained high.

With Karl's accession to the throne in December 1916, Tisza's hold on power- and certainly his influence- already weakened by continued military defeats began to slip.

Suffering from a popular perception as a man determined to see the war through to the bitter end (by no means the case), and as an opponent of social and political reform (certainly true), Tisza's resignation was forced by the more pro-Allied Emperor in May 1917. He thereafter served, for a short while, in the Hungarian home army.

Still associated with aggressive prosecution of a hopeless war a year later, and even (ironically) blamed for its inception, Magyar Communists assassinated Tisza in Budapest on October 31, 1918.




Tsar Nicholas II

He was born on May 18th, 1868 in Tsarskoe Selo. He was Russia's last Emperor.

Nicholas succeeded his father's throne, when Alexander III, died from liver disease on October 20th, 1984. Nicholas was 26.

That same year Nicholas married Princess Alexandra of Hesse-Darmstadt, the granddaughter of Queen Victoria. Alexandra was instrumental in convincing Nicholas to resist ever growing calls for increased democracy within Russia. Alexander was a firm believer in the autocratic principle. Nicholas required little persuasion; as a nationalist he decried those who favoured western style democracy. Alexandra was unpopular with the Russian elite, more so as evidence emerged of her increasing influence over her husband. Her reliance upon Grigory Rasputin in determining Russian policy angered many, utlimately leading to Rasputin's assassination.

Defeat in the war with Japan of 1904-1905 seriously damaged Russian prestige- and with it the esteem of the monarchy. Japan had launched a surprise attack on the Russian fleet based at Port Arthur; throughout the war the Russian navy was found wanting, although the army fared better in repulsing Japanese troops in Manchuria.

At the same time as Russia faced war with Japan, there was increasing industrial unrest at home. Workers who faced long hours and poor conditions increasingly formed protests.

In 1904 110,000 workers in St. Petersburg striked for four days in protest at the declining value of wages in real terms. Georgi Gapon, of the Assembly of Russian Workers, appealed to Nicholas for help in reducing working hours and improving pay and conditions. A consequent march on the Winter Palace was greeted by armed Cossacks: over 100 protestors were killed and many more wounded.

"Bloody Sunday", as it became known, sparked the 1905 Revolution, whereby strikes spread around the country and mutiny throughout the army and navy. Leon Trotsky founded the St. Petersburg Soviet in October, with 50 more being established over the next month in the rest of the country.

In response to such a wide-scale protest, and under the advice of close advisers, the Tsar published the "October Manifesto", which granted freedom of conscience, speech, meeting and association, and the end of imprisonment without trial. In addition, no new law would become effective without the approval of the Duma, a consultative body.

The October Manifesto did not satisfy Trotsky (who with his supporters was subsequently arrested for his actions taken in protest) but did take the sting out of the crisis that had formed. Although the Duma had been viewed as a toothless advisory body, at its first meeting in May 1906, it made demands for the releases of political prisoners, for trade union rights and land reform. In rejecting these demands Nicholas promptly dissolved the Duma.

Later that year Nicholas replaced the Moderate Chief Minister Sergi Witte with the more conservative Peter Stolypin. Stolypin attempted to balance the demands of both liberal and conservative factions in the country. He was ultimately unsuccessful: he was assassinated in 1911 by a member of the Socialist Revolutionary Party at the Kiev Opera House.

With Germany's decision to enter into the Triple Alliance system with Austria-Hungary and Italy- whereby each of the three nations agreed to come to the other's aid in the event of attack by either France or Russia-Russia naturally say Germany as its main potential enemy: this despite Nicholas's position as the cousin of German Kaiser, Wilhelm II.

Consequently Russia entered into an alliance with Britain and France, the "Triple Entente". When war was declared by Germany with France in August 1914, Russian came into the war on France's side.

Russian industrial unrest had continued into the first half of 1914. Up to half of the entire workforce are estimated to have striked that year. The war temporarily brought an effective end to industrial unrest however, although it later returned. The war also brought Nicholas political benefits; the establishment united behind him in the conduct of the war.

Dissatisfied with the army's conduct of the war, Nicholas took personal command in September. The Russian army were fighting on the Eastern Front and its ongoing lack of success was causing dissension at home. Unfortunately, now operating under Nicholas II's supreme command, its continued failure reflected directly upon the Tsar himself rather than the army command. Nicholas's popularity dwindled.

By late 1916 royalists within the Duma warned the Tsar that revolution was imminent; even so, Nicholas refused to sanction further constitutional reform. During the so-called "February Revolution" in 1917, which he misinterpreted as a minor uprising, his routine suppression orders to the Petrograd garrison sparked its mutiny on March 10th.

Nicholas II was persuaded to abdicate on March 15th 1917 under the recommendation of the Russian Army High Command. In search of exile elsewhere, Lloyd George offered a haven in Britain,  only for the with to be associated with his autocratic cousin at this point: a controversial decision. 

moved to the Siberian city of Ekaterinburg by the Bolsheviks, Nicholas and his family were executed on the night of  July 16/17, 1918.


Thursday, August 15, 2013

Arthur Zimmermann

Born October 5th, 1864 in Marggrabowa, East Prussia(Now Olecka, Poland).  He was the German foreign secretary during part of World War 1(1916-17), the author of a sensational proposal to Mexico to enter into an alliance against the United states.

After a career in the consular service, Zimmermann won transfer to the diplomatic branch in 1901. Because of the retiring nature of Gottlieb von Jagow, who became foreign secretary in 1913, Zimmermann conducted a large share of the relations with foreign envoys. As acting secretary in Jagow's absence, he participated, with Emperor William(Wilhelm II) and Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, in Germany's decision of July 5th, 1914, to support Austria-Hungary when, after the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand at Sarajevo, Austria-Hungary put pressure on Serbia, thus angering Russia. Zimmermann drafted the telegram to Vienna embodying Germany's decision, which intensified the crisis that culminated in the outbreak of war.

In 1916, when the German High Command insisted on the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare as the only remaining weapon to defeat the Allies, even at the risk of provoking the United States into belligerency, Jagow resigned. On November 25th, Zimmermann, who was regarded as "pro-U-boat", was appointed to succeed him. In an effort to nullify or at least to reduce U.S. intervention in Europe by engaging U.S. arms and energies elsewhere, Zimmermann planned to embroil the United States in war with Mexico and Japan. In pursuit of this goal, on January 16th, 1917, he sent a secret telegram in code(through the German ambassador in Washington, D.C.) to the German minister in Mexico, authorizing him to propose an alliance to Mexico's President Venustiano Carranza. The offer included "an understanding on our part that Mexico is to reconquer her lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona." Carranza was also asked to "invite the immediate adherence of Japan." Intercepted and decoded by British Admiralty intelligence, the telegram was mad available to President Woodrow Wilson, who caused it to be published on March 1st, 1917. In convincing Americans of German hostility toward the United States, the "Zimmermann Note" became one of the factors leading to the U.S. declaration of war against Germany 5 weeks later.

Zimmermann lost office just after the fall of Berthmann Hollweg's government in the summer of 1917 and never held it again. Zimmermann died June 6th, 1940 in Berlin, Germany.




Erich von Falkenhayn

He was born November 11th, 1861 in Graudenz, in West Prussia. He served as Chief of the Imperial German General Staff for part of the 1st World War before his eventual dismissal by Kaiser Wilhelm II. Having joined the army at an early age, Falkenhayn served as a military instructor to the Chinese army in 1899, where he remained until 1903. During the Chinese Boxer Rebellion he was a member of the German General Staff, seeing action when the Allies marched to relieve besieged Peking.

Upon his return to Germany, Falkenhayn continued to serve on the German General Staff, and was appointed Prussian Minister of War in 1913. Whilst in this role he and Helmuth von Moltke, then Chief of Staff, frequently clashed. However, with the declaration of war in August 1914 and the German setback at the Marne, the Kaiser, Wilhelm II, dismissed Moltke and replaced him with Falkenhayn on September 14th, 1914.

Falkenhayn's cautious nature appeared to make him well-suited to the realities of trench warfare, unlike many of his contemporaries. He was inclined to consider defensive rather than offensive operations-a sound strategy, but one ill-suited to the Eastern Front. His approach led him to reject an ambitious plan to capture the entire Russian army championed by Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludenorff.

Falkenhayn however believed that the real war was being fought on the other front, the Western Front. He conceived the idea of besieging the historic French city of Verdun in early 1916, of "bleeding it white" as he phrased it. He planned to draw the bulk of the French army into the Verdun salient, thus effectively tying up the French army, and then to methodically destroy them with concentrated artillery fire.

Certainly French losses at Verdun were significant, as were German casualties. It succeeded in diverting French attention solely towards the defence of Verdun, to the extent that the British offensive on the Somme on July 1st, 1916 was executed as much as anything else to provide relief for the French forces at Verdun. Even so, the German Verdun offensive was ultimately a failure; indeed, by the time the Somme offensive was started the French were already beginning to claw back ground.

With the failure of the Verdun offensive, for which the German Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, was scathing, together with the Russian resurgence at the hands of Brusilov, the loss of Bitolj to the Serbs, and the fall of Gorizia to Italy, the Kaiser finally decided to replace Falkenhayn with the more aggressive von Hindenburg on August 29th, 1916 when he heard news of Romania's declaration of war with Austria-Hungary.

Falkenhayn was sent to the Transylvania Front on August 29th 1916 to command Ninth Army. He defeated the Romanian Army at the Battle of the Red Tower Pass on September 30th, 1916, advancing towards Bucharest. Linking up with Mackensen's army in mid-November, Falkenhayn's troops entered Bucharest on December 6th, thereby defeating Romania.

Falkenhayn was next dispatched to Palestine to command the Ottoman forces in early 1917. A series of setbacks followed: he was defeated by General Allenby at Gaza on October 31st, 1917, and Jerusalem fell to the British in December. Falkenhayn was dismissed by General Liman von Sanders in February 1918; upon his return to Germany he retired.

Erich von Falkenhayn died on April 8th, 1922 near Potsdam.


Tuesday, August 13, 2013

  

Raymond Poincare

Born August 20, 1860 in Bar-le-Duc France. The son of an engineer, he was educated at the Ecole Polytechnique. After studying law at the University of Paris, he was admitted to the bar in 1882. Elected a deputy in 1887, he became six years later the youngest minister in the history of the Third Republic, holding the portfolio of education. In 1894 he served as minister of finance and in 1895 again as minister of education. In the Dreyfus Affair he declared that new evidence necessitated a retrial.

Despite the promise of a brilliant political career, Poincare left the Chamber of Deputies in 1903, serving until 1912 in the Senate, which was considered comparatively unimportant politically. He devoted most of his time to his private law practice, serving in the cabinet only once. In March 1906, as minister of finance. In January 1912 however, he became prime minister, serving simultaneously as foreign minister until January 1913. In the face of new threats from Germany, he conducted diplomacy with new decisiveness and determination. In August 1912 he assured the Russian government that his government would stand by the Franco-Russian alliance, and in November he concluded an agreement with Britain committing both countries to consult in the event of an international crisis as well as on joint military plans. Although his support of Russian activities in the Balkans and his uncompromising attitude toward Germany have been cited as evidence of his being a warmongering revanchist. Poincare believed that in the existing state of contemporary Europe war was inevitable and that only a strong alliance guaranteed security. His greatest fear was that France might be isolated as it had been in 1870, easy prey for a military superior Germany.

Poincare ran for the office president; despite the opposition of the left, under Georges Clemenceau a lifelong enemy, he was elected on January 17th, 1913. Although the presidency was a position with little real power, he hoped to infuse new vitality into it and make it the base of a union sacree of right, left, and centre. Throughout World War 1(1914-18) he strove to preserve national unity, even confiding the government to Clemenceau, the man best qualified to lead the country to victory.

After his term as president ran out in 1920, Poincare returned to the senate and was for a time chariman of the reparations commission. He supported the thesis of Germany's war quilt implicit in the Versailles Treaty; and when he served again as prime minister and minister for foreign affairs(1922-24), he refused a delay in German reparation payments and in January 1923 ordered French troops into the Ruhr in reaction to the default. Unseated by a leftist bloc, he was returned as prime minister in July 1926 and is largely credited with having solved France's acute financial crisis by stabilizing the value of the franc and basing it on the gold standard. Under his highly successful economic policies the country enjoyed a period of new prosperity. Poincare died October 15, 1934 in Paris.




                                                              Kaiser Wilhelm II

Wilhelm was born on January 27th, 1859 in Berlin, the eldest child of Crown Prince Frederick of Prussia and Victoria, daughter of Queen Victoria of the United Kingdom. A difficult birth left Wilhelm with a withered arm, which he always tried to conceal. In 1881, after a period of military service, Wilhelm married Augusta Victoria, Princess of Schleswig-Holstein, and they had 7 children.

In 1888, Wilhelm's father succeeded as Frederick III. He died shortly afterwards, making Wilhelm kaiser at the age of 29. Although he had previously admired the great German statesman Otto von Bismarck, withing two years Wilhelm had forced his resignation. He was a strong believer in increasing the strength of the German armed forces, particularly the navy. His policies towards Britain were contradictory. He alienated Britain with his naval expansion and a policy of aggressive German colonial expansion, and also supported the Boers in their fight against the British. But he was also closely related to the British royal family and was particularly fond of his grandmother, Queen Victoria.

Following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914, Wilhelm encouraged the Austrians to adopt an uncompromising line against Serbia, effectively writing them a "blank cheque" for German support in the event of war. He appeared not to realise the chain reaction this would trigger. Russia and her allies France and Britain entered the war against Germany and Austria. Wilhelm tried to scale back the mobilisation of Germany's armed forces, but was prevented by the Germany military. While theoretically supreme commander, Wilhelm found himself excluded from military decisions, but crippled chances of a compromise peace by encouraging the grandiose war aims of certain generals and politicians.

In 1918,  the United States' full scale entry into the war, combined with severe German shortages of men and materials from years of attrition-based trench warfare, led to Germany's military collapse. Wilhelm was forced to abdicate and went into exile in the Netherlands. Attempts by the victorious allies to extradite and try him for war crimes came to nothing. With Adolf Hitler's rise to power after 1933, Wilhelm had hopes of being restored but they came to nothing and he died on June 4th, 1941.

Monday, August 12, 2013

Europe on Fire

The day Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie were assassinated, crowds of non-Serbs Bosnians marched through the streets of Sarajevo holding up black-draped Austro-Hungarian flags and pictures of the slain Archduke and his wife Sophie.

Hooligans attacked buildings that housed Bosnian Serb communities-they vandalized schools, newspaper offices and a hotel. They even attacked the residence of the city's leading Orthodox priest, breaking the windows in his home. Demonstrations where happening all over the cities of the dual monarchy, resulting in 50 people getting killed and one injured. Plus Munich and Berlin were rioting as well, but they were smaller riots and non-violent and where quickly subsided.

Now the uproar in the Serb Capital of Belgrade was more intense. The Serbs where "falling into one another's arms of delight". Disorderly crowds roamed the streets and as news arrived of the disturbances in Sarajevo, their jubilation was laced with anger. Belgrade's newspaper was making matters worse by printing that 10,000 of the Serbs living in Austria-Hungary had been injured or killed and that the Serb women where being subjected to outrages. (This was all untrue)

It was very easy to make to much out of this situation. Now the demonstrations in Sarajevo came to an end just in a few hours, and Vienna promptly announced that the victims would be compensated for their loses. The Serb government even conducted itself responsibly, attempting to discourage the demonstrations.

Now life in Vienna went back to normal. The slain Archduke had been to cold a man to even become popular with the public and no one mourned him. Franz's assassination hardly made an impression. So much so that by Sunday and Monday, crowds in Vienna where listening to music and drinking wine like nothing ever happened. In fact hardly anyone went to the Archduke's funeral and his friends where outrage over it. And the only thing Emperor Franz Joseph found necessary was to explain that he should have done more.

The Austro-Hungarain leadership was determined to take action, but was no where near ready to do so. Meeting after meeting occurred 48 hours after Franz's death. Foreign Minister Berchtold, Field Marshall Conrad, Hungarian Prime Minister Istran Tisza, Emperor Franz Joseph and others of the Austro-Hungarian government conferred for hours, but no consensus emerged. Berchtold and Conrad where all for attacking Serbia. But the Emperor was uncertain of this action and Tiszar opposed it. The only thing they all agreed on was that nothing could be done until certain preliminaries had been attended to.

1st they had to make sure they had Germany's support. Austria knew that attacking Serbia was going to be a concern with Russia. And Austria couldn't go to war against Serbia and Russia without Germany's help. Austria also needed Hungary's support, but knew it was going to be hard to get them on board because of the clumsy arrangement that Emperor Franz Joseph had made. Vienna couldn't make war without the consent of Budapest and the Hungarians were sure to have little interest. The Hungarians felt that failure in such a matter would be a disaster, but they also felt that to succeed would be regrettable. 

Finally no action would be possible until the Austria army had been mobilized. And that was going to be a very difficult and expensive task. First the had to get the machines and supplies they needed, plus getting all their troops together. And do all this without Russia and Serbia finding out. Also complicating things was the fact that the President of France Raymond Poincare was paying a visit  to Russia's Capital in St. Petersburgh. If Austria-Hungary took any steps to go after the Serbs or even signaled a mobilization, the leaders of France and Serbia would be given the opportunity to coordinate their response and cement their alliance.

So with everything slowing them down, the Austria-Hungarian armies could not be ready till mid August. The only good note they had was Germany's full support. Kaiser Wilhelm had like and admired Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Kaiser and the men around him needed no reminding that with Russia and France allied against them and Britain leaning that way, Germany needed Austria and needed to help Austria defend itself against the centrifugal force that was the Balkan nationalism.

Now Kaiser was away on his boat when he received word of the assassination. He returned home immediately and flew into a rage when he fount out that the German Ambassador urged the Austrians not to be quick in attacking the Serbs, Kaiser exploded. He stated that Serbia must be disposed of and his words quickly spread to Vienna, and Austria was delighted.This showed the German Ambassador Heinrich von Tschirschky the error of his ways. He knew Kaiser wanted him to be tough and to urge the Austrians to be tough. Heinrich welcomed the challenge, for he feared that Austria-Hungary was weakening almost to the point of collapse.

Now on July 5th and 6th Kaiser and Germany's Deputy Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmerman, met separately with emissaries from Vienna. Kaiser didn't tell the Austrian's what to do, but did tell them that something needed to be done about Serbia and soon. And that they had Germany's full support no matter what. This moment became known as the "Blank Check" the promise that Germany would stand with Vienna no matter what happened. But the Austrian's hadn't come to agreement with Hungary yet, so nothing was being done. So Kaiser nor Zimmerman took the trouble to ask-one indication among many that at this point the Germans did not regard the situation as being serious enough to require much thought or care. Even War Minister Erich von Falkenhayn after being briefed on the situation, thought it likely that the Austrians were going to have to be prodded into action.

Now the Austrian's armed with Kaiser's promise of support from Germany, decided to take everything slow, including telling Germany what their plans where. They didn't even bother to tell Germany that they thought a war was impossible after the French visited St. Petersburgh. Germany assumed that Austria intended to strike at Serbia without delay, which would allow Germany to move all their forces to the border with Russia.

But Kaiser and his associated saw little possibility that Vienna would do anything regarding Serbia. There was even doubt that the Hapsburg Empire would do anything to save itself. The Germans where also scornful about Russia. It was all but inconceivable to them that this time, unlike 1908,1912, and 1913, the Russians would feel not only capable, but compelled to take military action. So shortly after talks with Austria, Kaiser told Falkenhayn that no military preparations were necessary. So Kaiser went back to his boat and told his admirals that they where not headed for war. Besides Tsar's views where not on the side of the Prince's(Franz Ferdinand) murder. Plus France and Russia are not ready for war. So all the German officials went on vacation. With all principal figures of Germany's government and military scattered, there was no one to make or coordinate any plans of responding to anything done by other countries, or even staying abreast of developments. Even during the July 5th & 6th meeting, the Germans showed less interest in the Serbia problem than in Berchtold's arcane scheme for using Bulgaria as a lever to pry Romania out of its alliance with Russia.

Back in Vienna the promise of Germany's support was great news, but all attention had swung to the Hungarians. At center stage was Hungary's Prime Minister Count Tiszar who cared little for the Hapsburg Empire, except for the fact that its existence benefited the Hungarians. Tiszar was absolutely against to any Austro-Hungarian expansion into Serbia. He even warned Emperor Franz Joseph that any effort in that direction would cause a civil war in Hungary.

Hoping to approve a course of action, on July 7th Berchtold assembled Austria-Hungary's Council of Ministries. But little was accomplished. Tiszar wasn't going to do anything and had every intention to divert Berchtold's plans towards Bulgaria and Romania. But when Tiszar saw that everyone had lost interest and realized that a showdown with Serbia was the only thing that would satisfy the Austrians, he found ways to slow down the process. He insisted nothing be done until he had a chance to send a memo to Emperor Franz Joseph explaining his objections. Berchtold and the council members had no choice but to agree. Tiszar was after all the head of the Hungarian government. So most of the discussions was focused on the idea that Serbia should be presented with a set of demands. But Tiszar was afraid that if they made to harsh of demands to the Serbs, it would result in a European War. Tiszar felt if they were reasonable with their demands they would have a splendid diplomatic success. He felt this kind of success would improve their situation and give them a chance of initiating an advantageous policy in the Balkans. But no one agreed or cared about what Tiszar proposed. The Austro-Hungarian War Minister responded that " a diplomatic success would be of no use at all" and would be " interpreted as weakness".

Now with everyone but Tiszar in agreement that they needed to advance on Serbia, one question remained. What would happen to Serbia? Tiszar said we could shrink Serbia down, but we can't annihilate it. He knew the Russians would fight to the death before letting that happen. For once everyone agreed with Tiszar and Serbia would be made smaller. Some parts would go to Bulgaria, Greece, and Albania. What remained of Serbia though formally an autonomous state, was to be an Austro-Hungarian satellite. Now Berchtold seen this as an opportunity to give everyone what they wanted, but had every intention of seeing the destruction of Serbia.

Now the council all agreed that if Serbia was not crushed it would be impossible to keep their south slavs subjects from fighting to break free of Hapsburg control. Another fear they had was how the other great powers like Germany, might react to what was being planned. In the weeks to follow, no one not even Germany would be told of the councils decision to dismember Serbia after taking it by force. On the contrary, all the great powers would be lied to and told that Austria had no territorial aspirations where Serbia was concerned. Tiszar even decided to go along with this approach. In fact later in the meeting, Tiszar told the council he was anxious to meet the others halfway and was prepared to concede that the demands addressed to Serbia be hard indeed. But not to the point that it would alert everyone of their true intentions.

By July 13th, Vienna ambassador in Berlin was reporting that Germany was growing nervous about Vienna's failure to act. Now Tiszar didn't want to use the word ultimatum in with the demands sent to Serbia, so Berchtold cheerfully offered to a compromise. He would send a note with a time limit instead of an ultimatum. The note gave Serbia 48 hours to respond to Vienna without being told what Vienna would do if the response proved unsatisfactory. Austria's ambassadors were under instructions to assure Russia and Germany that Vienna was planning nothing that would cause concern.

But yet again, Berchtold was decieving friends and enemies alike. On July 19th the council met again in Vienna. They reviewed Berchtold's note and gave the approval. Most of the demands where reasonable, a few however where susceptible to being interpreted as requiring Serbia to compromise its sovereignty. The most objectionable called for direct Austria involvement in Serbia's handling of the assassination investigation and related internal affairs. It was agreed that Berchtold have the note delivered to the Prime Minister if Serbia in Belgrad on July 23rd. Tiszar was no longer objecting. With Germany's support and the complexities of the Balkans being almost infinite, he was beginning to see Serbia's friendly relations with Romania as a threat to Hungary's control of Transylvania.

On July 23rd when the note was to be delivered, Prime Minister Pasic knowing a communication from Vienna was coming, left Belgrade on an electioneering trip into Serbia's newest provinces. Giesl von Gieslingen delivered the note. Upon his arrival he was taken to see the Foreign Minister. An interpreter was on hand, because the minister spoke neither German nor French. Giesle read the note with the complaints of Serbia's behavior and told them it would no longer be tolerated. As the Foreign Minister realized what was going on, he tried to tell Giesl that he could not except such note. Giesl, out of patience said fine, the only thing he could do was leave the note and go. In departing he said no response other than unconditional acceptance would satisfy Austria, and that Serbia's response was required by 6pm Saturday.

News of Austria's demand had little impact except for Russia. Britain who was ensnared in a violet crisis having to do with Irish Home Rule, had scant attention for the Balkans. The London newspapers never friendly toward Serbia, dealt generously with Austria's demands. There was even less interest in France. They where dealing with a scandal, that had erupted when the wife of a former Prime Minister shot and killed a newspaper editor. Berlin was also quiet. Kaiser was back sailing and didn't know about the note to Serbia until he seen it in the Norwegian newspapers. And for the 1st time he showed signs of serious concern, and headed home. He still had no idea what the Austrians had put in their note.

Copies of the note where requested, but when they came, they where incomplete and no indication that the Austrians where going to reject the Serbs response. No on knew anything and that was Berchtold's plan all along. Getting his government to commit to action despite Tiszar's resistence and the deadly inertia of the dual monarchy's dual bureacracy, he was determined to make further complications impossible. Thus he compounded his earlier mistakes. He left Russia completely unprepared for the harshness of the note. He done nothing to help newspapers across Europe to help the European public to understand why Austria was taking action at last. Little had been disclosed and less publicized about Vienna's success in tracing the assassination plot back to Belgrade and that the officials of the Kingdom of Serbia had been involved. Vienna had made no public complaints about Belgrade's failure to investigate the assassination. Therefore Vienna's not was more of a surprise, than an active attack on Serbia after the assassination would have been.

By not the assassination of the Archduke was 3 weeks old. And with nothing having be done, everyone went back to day to day life. So no one felt a military action was required.

Russian's Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov, flew into a rage when he learned of the Austria note. He vented that he and Russia had been deceived, and that there was no way Austria could send such a note without the approval of Germany. Sergei felt both countries where trying to drive Russia out of the Balkans. 

You are setting fire to Europe!! Sazonov told the Austrian Ambassador Prince Regent of Serbia, was sending wires to Tsar Nicholas asking for help. Nicholas was being told that his people would not tolerate another abandonment of their brothers, the South Slavs. Russia would be disgraced and have no more friends in the Balkans, and would definitely have no respect in Europe. Such a failure would end up causing a revolution-worse than the one of 1905.

Russia decided that if they showed enough firmness, perhaps Austria would hold back. But by Friday July 24th, the day before Serbia was to respond to Austria's note, Sazonov was telling the Russian army's Chief of Staff to ready for mobilization. It was at this point that the Balkan crisis became an European one.