As big and confused and drawn out as it was, the Battle of Tannenberg was a model of clarity and simplicity compared with the more famous Battle of the Marne, which has come down to us in history as the fight that saved Paris but in fact was settled by one side's decision not to fight.
Far more than Tannenberg, "First Marne"(there would be another huge and crucial encounter in almost exactly the same place four long years later) wasn't a single great encounter but a weeks-long series of maneuvers punctuated with bursts of ferocious combat. It involved millions rather than mere hundreds of thousands of troops, and they were stretched out over vast expanses of territory. Its starting date is hard to pinpoint; traditionally it has been placed on or about September 5th, but events began flowing toward it during the closing days of August, at the time when the Germans were destroying the Russian 2nd Army in East Prussia.
All the French and German forces, as August ended, were still arranged in the order in which they had begun the war. Kluck's 1st Army was still the outer edge of the Schleiffen right wing, but now it was well south of Belgium, setting the pace for the rest of the German line as it swung down toward Paris like a great hour hand in counterclockwise motion.
South of Verdun, the German left was also pushing toward Paris but making much slower progress. In place after place there, in woods and fields and on stony hilltops, men were dying by the thousands in savage, obscure fights the names of which are almost completely forgotten today.
Movement had always been most pronounced at the other end of the line, where Lanrezac and the British Expeditionary Force were no longer even attempting to turn and fight. The situation north of Paris had become almost surreal; hundreds of thousands of weary French and British doggedly trudging southward, hundreds of thousands of equally weary Germans following in their tracks, and almost none of them doing any actual fighting. Looming over all was the idea of Paris, the supreme symbolic prize but also a great if dubiously prepared fortress with a 60-mile perimeter of defensive walls and artillery emplacements. Bulow, when he got there, was supposed to besiege it while Kluck went around. One question was whether Bulow could get there. Another was whether, having arrived, he could take the city. The Germans had encircled Paris in the Franco-Prussian War but failed to get inside.
Schlieffen had predicted that a decisive battle would take place on or about the 40th day after mobilization. As the 25th day arrived, then the 30th, mounting tension and the increasing exhaustion
of the troops as they drew closer to Paris made it seem that a climax of some kind had to be imminent.
The commanders on both sides had little reason to feel that they were in charge of, rather than reacting to, events. At German supreme headquarters, which had been moving westward in cautious steps from Berlin to Koblenz and then on to Luxembourg, the continuing progress of Kluck and Bulow was igniting celebration. Moltke did not join in. As his armies penetrated deeper into France, clashing with or pursuing the French according to what Joffre was ordering his generals to do on any given day, his contact with them became increasingly tenuous.(Radio was still a new and highly unreliable medium.) Keenly aware of his own blindness, under no illusions about his ability to direct the campaign with so little knowledge of what was happening at the front, Moltke became unwilling to issue orders. Expectations became cloudy, prediction impossible, every shred of information precious. Would Kluck, his army worn down and outrunning its lines of supply, really able to circle all the way around Paris and still remain capable of attacking the French? Or might the best chances now be in Alsace and Lorraine, where the French defenses were reported to be vulnerable?
Joffre, even he surrendered great expanses of countryside, was accomplishing important things. He was making it impossible for the Germans to close with his left and force it into a fight it had little chance of winning. And he was maintaining good order; his armies remained fully under control in conditions that could easily have produced chaos. They were staying in formation and following routes and timetables worked out by headquarters, their every move planned, coordinated, and carefully directed. But this couldn't continue.
Unless they were going to march past Paris and leave it to the Germans, at some point soon the French, and presumably the British, were going to have to stop and make a stand. When this was going to be possible, or where or even whether, remained unclear. The sphinx like Joffre was sharing his plans, if at this point he had any, with no one.
Lanrezac was daily more pessimistic. Sir John French, thinking it likely that France had already lost the war, was talking of saving his little army by pulling it out of the line, perhaps even taking it back to England. The only really aggressive commander remaining in the area was Kluck, but his aggressiveness was taking a heavy toll on his troops. They were now advancing an average of more than 20 miles daily, each man burdened with his 10 lb rifle and his 60 or more pounds of gear as the hot dry summer of 1914 blazed on. Often, at the end of a long day on the march, the men had to spread out across the countryside and forage for meat and the vegetables that were, providentially, being harvested in abundance at summer's end. As they moved 60 and then 80 miles beyond the farthest points that their railway support could reach support could reach their horses began to collapse, the problem of supply threatened to become unmanageable.
The German cavalry had difficulty operating in this country; rivers, canals, woods, and other obstructions slowed and complicated every foray. When horsemen closed with enemy troops, they found themselves no match for machined guns and magazine-fed rifles. The labor of constantly moving artillery, and with it 1000's of shells, was terrible and endless.
Things were little better for the French and British, but as they drew closer to Paris they were moving toward rather than away from supplies and reinforcements. They were able to make increased use of the railroad network centered on the capital. The city was seized in with fear. Politicians asked if Joffre intended to retreat forever, got no answer, and called for his dismissal.
On Lanrezac's left the British were retreating so fast-the infantry given only 4 hours' rest in 24 hours, the cavalry even less-that the Germans no longer knew where they were or if they remained a factor that had to be reckoned with. In his haste, French left Lanrezac's flank once again exposed. But the Germans too were having a hard time keeping their armies aligned. Kluck was outrunning Bulow and beginning to realize that somewhere out in front of him-a juicily tempting target-was Lanrezac's naked flank. On August 27th he had received fresh instructions from Moltke reiterating that his mission continued to be what it had been from the beginning; to march around Paris and proceed from there to the east. By this time, however, Moltke was receiving sketchy reports of a buildup of forces near Paris. The activity being reported was the birth of the French 6th Army, which Joffre had let General Gallieni have for the defense of the capital. Moltke saw these new forces, correctly, as a threat to his right wing.
Accordingly, on August 28th he sent new instructions. Kluck was to stay not just in line with Bulow but slightly behind him-"in echelon" is the military term. But he neglected to say anything about the new threat from the direction of Paris, thus making it impossible for the 1st Army's commander to see how these new orders were necessary or even made sense. To put himself in echelon with Bulow, Kluck would have had to stop his advance for a day or more, perhaps even turn around. In doing so he would have thrown away his chance to hit Lanrezac, perhaps to start the unraveling of the French left, and possibly to win the war. He decided that if he continued to move forward but shifted toward southeast, he could fulfill the letter of his new orders, bring his army closer to where Bulow was heading if not literally to Bulow's side, and continue his pursuit. Destroying Lanrezac's army, or at a minimum pushing it eastward out of Bulow's path and away from Paris, would surely satisfy the spirit of his instructions even if it violated their letter. And so Kluck crossed the River Marne on September 3rd and pushed on. He felt free to do so because he was ignorant of one important fact and wrong about another; ignorant of the new French army taking shape to the west, wrong in believing that the mysterious disappearance of the British meant that the BEF was no longer an effective fighting force.
Among Joffre's problems, at this point, was getting the BEF back into the war. He needed the cooperation of Sir John French-something easier said than done, the British commander having decided that his allies weren't only unreliable but doomed. Joffre hoped that he could restore French's confidence, and make a try at blocking the German advance in the process, by having Lanrezac attack Bulow's army near the towns of St. Quentin and Guise. Learning that Lanrezac was unwilling, Joffre went to 5th Army headquarters and confronted his old friend in person. When Lanrezac continued to resist, Joffre threatened to dismiss him. "If you refuse to carry out my orders," Joffre was reported to have said, "I'll have you shot!"
Joffre went next to the BEF's headquarters at Compiegne. There, in the grand chateau that had become a base of operations for the BEF's staff, he all but begged French to turn his army around, assuring him that in doing so he would be protected by Lanrezac on his right and by the new 6th Army on his left. French refused. He said that the sorry state of his army left him with no choice but to take it south of Paris for at least 10 days of refitting and recuperation.
Lanrezac's attack had begun, meanwhile, and quickly developed into a hard fight. The French were soundly whipped on their left; Lanrezac had again been correct in warning that the German 2nd Army would overwhelm them there. But on the right, at Guise, the battle seesawed inconclusively and the French were able to hold. At one critical point their position was saved when the dashing
a flamboyant character whom the admiring British troops called Desperate Frankie, led an almost theatrical counterattack on horseback, his sword held aloft, accompanied by unfurled regimental banners and a band playing "La Marseillaise." The other side had its moment of glory after the Prussian First Foot Guards, as elite a unit as any in the armies of Germany, was thrown back and seemed in danger of falling apart.
The 2nd of Kaiser Wilhelm's 6 sons, took command. Beating a drum, he rallied the troops and led them forward in a successful counterattack. The Prince survived, but his son of the commander of the guards corps was killed. Most of the generals on both sides were men in their 50's and 60's, and many had sons in uniform. As the fighting went on and losses continued to be heavy among junior officers responsible for leading attacks and organizing defenses, news that yet another general's son had been killed became almost commonplace.
At Guise, Lanrezac found himself with both flanks so dangerously exposed that he had no choice but to withdraw. Bulow, though he declared victory in reporting to Moltke, had taken heavy casualties. He decided that he had to stop for a day. He asked Kluck to move closer-farther east-to support him. Kluck, hungrier than ever for Lanrezac's flank, agreed. Joffre had had no choice but to accept Lanrezac's decision to resume his retreat. Without the BEF he lacked the manpower to make a stand, as desperately necessary as a stand of some kind was beginning to be.
French, no doubt, was guided in his obstinacy by the instructions he had received from Kitchener before leaving England; to regard his army as independent of the French and to protect it from destruction. Despite his concerns, however, the condition of the BEF was something short of desperate. The corps commanded by Smtih-Dorrien, having borne the brunt at Mons and Le Cateau, was indeed no longer fully functional. But the other corps, the one commanded by Haig, had still seen little hard fighting. Haig had, in fact, agreed to an appeal from Lanrezac to move his corps north to join in the fight at Guise, but before he could act he was countermanded by French. This had deepened Lanrezac's sense of betrayal.
In his reports to London, the BEF's commander had much to say about his lack of confidence in the French but little about his own movements and plans. It was only obliquely, from other sources, that the cabinet learned that he had denied Joffre's urgent request for help, that he had decided to move behind Paris, and that he was even considering a withdrawal to the coast. Kitchener sent a wire asking him to explain. When French replied that he was indeed withdrawing south of the River Seine and that "my confidence in the ability of the leaders of the French Army to carry this campaign to a successful conclusion is fast waning," Kitchener shot back another message informing him that he was expected to "as far as possible conform to the plans of General Joffre for the conduct of the campaign." In response, French again gave vent to his disdain for his allies and emphasized how unready the BEF was to withstand further combat. It may have been the haughtiness of his tone-"I think you had better trust me to watch the situation and act according to circumstances"-that prompted Kitchener to don his field marshal's uniform and cross the Channel by destroyer that night.
The next afternoon Kitchener, French, and Joffre met at the British embassy in Paris. Joffre told the Englishmen that with trainloads of troops pouring in from the east, he now had two armies in formation-not only the 6th at Paris but also a new 8th, which was to be inserted immediately east of the 5th. The Germans, he said, were probably unaware of these new units, and almost certainly couldn't know that a new French army now lay on their right. Thus it might now be possible to turn the tables-if the BEF would come forward. French argued, complained, and resisted. As he would acknowledge in his postwar memoir, he not only had no confidence in his allies but was deeply offended by Kitchener's sudden appearance in France. He thought that His Lordship was undercutting him with the impossible French and insulting him by wearing his uniform rather than attire appropriate to what he now was; a representative not of His Majesty's army but of the government. Kitchener too French into a separate room. It's not clear what was said there. French's account states that he put Kitchener in his place in no uncertain terms, but the aftermath of the conversation makes that unlikely. When the 2 men emerged, there was no further need for discussion. French was prepared to take the BEF north.
Joffre went to 5th Army headquarters, took his old friend Lanrezac off for a stroll in a nearby schoolyard, and there relieved him of his command. Lanrezac may have saved France by first to understand what the Germans were planning in Belgium, by putting his army in the path of the Schlieffen right wing, and by being the only army commander unwilling to sacrifice his troops in futile attacks. He had absorbed blow after blow from the invaders, performing well Charleroi and Guise and keeping his army in good order through its long retreat. But now he had become expendable. Was he, as Joffre would claim, too worn down to remain capable of acting decisively? Or was Joffre unable to forgive subordinates who disagreed with him and turned out to be right? It hardly mattered. What did matter was that Lanrezac hated Sir John French and French hated him. Joffre was determined to do everything possible to satisfy the British. Lanrezac's successor was obvious;
a particular favorite of the BEF.
Farther to the east, the front was aflame. Moltke was hurling his 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th Armies against the French 4th, 3rd, 2nd, and 1st. The Germans were repulsed, fell back, and were counterattacked in their turn. Joffre by this point was firing generals almost wholesale; by September 6th he would replace the commanders of 2 of his original 5 armies, 7 corps, and 20 infantry and 4 cavalry divisions. Other officers were rising to fill vacancies.
after performing well as corps commander in Lorraine at the start of the war and heroically during the retreat that followed, was promoted to command of the new 9th Army.
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whose brigade had distinguished itself as part of Lanrezac's command in early fighting in Belgium, was given a division.
Uncertainty gave way to panic. The government left Paris for Bordeaux on the Atlantic Coast. But in the midst of it all Joffre remained impassive, maddeningly silent, calm. No matter how alarming the situation, how terrible the emergency, the tall and rotund generalissimo never seemed disturbed. He became famous for the care he took always to have a good lunch followed by a nap, end the day with a good dinner, and always get a full night's sleep(in bed at 9, back at work at 5). Even when things seemed to be at their worst, he made his staff understand that under no circumstances was his rest to be disturbed. But between mealtimes and bedtimes he was steadily on the move, using a big touring car driven by a Grand Prix racing champion to make repeated visits to his generals, especially those on the left. Thus he was able to keep himself in touch with events and observe his subordinates in action. He said so little during his visits, has so little to say even when told of shocking events or asked for guidance, that some of the men who dealt with him decided that he was little better than a stately idiot and that his principal contribution was his tranquilizing example. He has also been described as viciously political and self-serving behind his rock like exterior. He has been accused of dismissing subordinates not so much for failure to perform as for becoming potential rivals or, worst of all, for showing their chief to have been wrong.
But fools rarely succeed under the kinds of circumstances confronting Joffre, and it wasn't by accident that things began to turn his way. The decision to strip troops from his embattled right wing and send them west by rail was his, and the consequences couldn't have been more important. The number of divisions facing the German right, 17 and a half on August 23rd, rose to 41 by September 6th. In his way, gradually, Joffre gave himself one of the greatest advantages a general can have; superior mass. He magnified the significance of what has to be considered Moltke's most grievous mistake; his incremental removal of nearly a quarter of a million men from the right wing, which was left without enough divisions to do all the things needing to be done.
Thus the great strike force that had obsessed Schlieffen literally to his dying breath found itself outnumbered. It was also enfeebled; bone tired, short of supplies, and increasingly without food. It is possible that Moltke's greatest mistake was in sending reinforcements to his left, which was in no danger, and accomplishing little of importance, instead of to Kluck and Bulow, where they might have made all the difference. Apparently he was discouraged from doing so by the Belgians' destruction of key railways.
The French, in contrast to the Germans, were reaping all the benefits of fighting on home ground with interior lines of communication. Every 24 hours another 32 trains arrived at the capital loaded with troops and guns from the east. Even now, however, Joffre could find no way of stopping the Great Retreat. He continued to wait and watch. "A natural reluctance to abandon even provisionally more of our own territory," he wrote to the minister of war as late as September 3rd, "must not make us engage too early in general battle that might be launched in unpropitious circumstances."
Moltke now made a change of strategy so far-reaching that it amounted to the end of the Schlieffen Plan. Kluck and Bulow were told to advance. They were to stand in place and face west against whatever forces the enemy was mustering near Paris. All the German armies were to return to the attack. The 3rd Army was to fight its way southward to the River Seine. The 4th and 5th were to advance west of Verdun, the 6th and 7th to force a crossing of the Moselle River. The goal of this last two pairs of armies was to break through on their respective fronts, link up, and so encircle the entire French right in the area around Verdun. Never in history had there been an encirclement on such a scale; it would dwarf Tannenberg. There was no way of being confident that such a thing was possible. The irony of this sudden and drastic shift was that its success would depend on the ability of the German left wing to get past the very fortifications whose strength had made the Schlieffen Plan seem necessary in the 1st place.
It's difficult to judge whether Moltke's change of thinking was rooted in a genuine expectation of success or a desperate sense that his right wing was doomed to failure. It's certain that he did not believe the triumphal reports that continued to arrive at his headquarters and cause his staff to rejoice. "We must not deceive ourselves," he told a member of the German government. "We have had successes, but we have not had victory. Victory means annihilation of the enemy's power of resistance. When armies of millions of men are opposed, the victor has prisoners. Where are ours?...The relatively small number of captured guns shows me that the French have withdrawn in good order and according to plan. The hardest work is still to be done."
As remote as he was from the action, as inadequate as knowledge of the situation on the ground was, his intuition was sound.
