With the BEF and Lnarezac's army in almost headlong flight it seemed to many on Motlke's staff that the Germans had already won the west; "complete victories" were being declared. Belgium was firmly in hand, and the right wing was in France and staying on Schiefflen's schedule. The German 4th and 5th armies had broken the back of the French offensive in the Ardennes, and in the southeast
of Bavaria continued to report that he was gaining ground, taking 1'000's of prisoners and capturing guns. Rupprecht was also continuing to badger Moltke for more troops with which to press his advantage. Moltke agreed. He also decided to send 3 infantry corps and a cavalry division to East Prussia. These were fateful moves. Combined with Moltke's earlier adjustments-the use of 2 corps to besiege Antwerp, and of another to besiege a French strong hold at Maubeuge-they would reduce his right wing from 17 corps to fewer than 12. This was a reduction of 275,00 men, and it was in addition to the Germans battlefield losses. The hammer upon which Schlieffen had wanted to bet everything thus shrank by nearly a 1/3.
Meanwhile Joffre was doing the opposite, using his rail lines to transfer increasing numbers of troops from his right to his left. Even as the Germans continued their advance, in terms of manpower the balance at the western end of the front was gradually shifting in France's favor.
Moltke's decision to dispatch troops to East Prussia has been much criticized but is easy to understand. He had good reason to be alarmed not only by the situation in East Prussia but by what was happening all across the eastern theater. He knew that the Austrian invasion of Serbia-an invasion he had opposed, arguing rightly that all of the Hapsburg empires available troops were needed against Russia-had ended in total defeat. He knew too that massive Russian forces were engaging the Austrians on the Galician plan to the north of Serbia, and that if this too ended badley, Conrad's position would become desperate, And his own commander in East Prussia had told Moltke that the German position there was already desperate.
That commander, the fat and elderly
and intelligent enough general but one with no combat experience, had at his disposal a single army of some 155,000 men-11 undermanned divisions of infantry and 1 of cavalry, barley 1/10 of Germany's available total. Moving against this 8th army, a small one by the standards of 1914, were 2 exceptionally large Russian armies that out numbered it by a huge margin.
The Russian 1st army commanded by
had been 1st to cross the border into Germany territory, approaching from the east. Thereafter it had continued to move forward, capturing towns, burning the farms of the Junkers, and clashing with elements of Prittwitz's army 1st at Stallaponen and the at Gumbinnen. It was shortly after the Gumbinnen fight, and upon learning that the Russian 2nd army under
was entering East Prussia from the south with 14 1/2 infantry divisions, 4 divisions of cavalry, 1,160 guns, that Prittwitz had telephoned Moltke and told him that he had to abandon East Prussia. He was afraid that if he stayed where he was, Samsonov would soon be behind him and able to block his escape. The situation was ripe for an encirclement that would end in the destruction of the 8th army and leave Germany defenseless in the East. There was no alternative to withdrawing behind the north-south Vistula River, Prittwitz said. Moltke didn't demur. Giving up the Prussian homeland was an intolerable thought, but everything being accomplished in France would become meaningless if the 8th army were lost.
That Prussian homeland was already involved in the war more directly than any other part of Germany, with the invaders inevitably clashing with the inhabitants and outrages being committed on both sides. An Englishman, John Morse, was serving among the Russian troops, and he later wrote of the brutalities he witnessed. "The Cossack had a strong disinclination to be taken prisoner," he observed, "and I knew several of them sacrificing their lives rather than fall into the hands of the Germans, who heartily detest these men, and usually murdered such as they succeeded in catching-and murdered them after preliminary tortures, according to reports which reached us. The country people certainly showed no mercy to stragglers falling into their hand. They usually pitch-forked them to death; and this lethal weapon was a favorite with the ladies on both sides of the border, many a fine Teuton meeting his end by thrusts from this implement."
Members of Moltkes' staff began telephoning the commanders of the 4 corps that made up the 8th Army. The technology of the day made this a laborious process, requiring much waiting for connections, much shouting into receivers, much uncertainty about what the faint and fuzzy voice on the other end of the line was saying. Moltke's men had one question; was a retreat really necessary? The answer was unanimously negative; the 8th Army need not, must not, fall back. This was reported to Moltke, who concluded that Prittwitz had lost his nerve and could not be left in command.
Prittwitz himself, however, was having his mind changed too. This was accomplished by a new member of his staff, the tall, chubby, hard-drinking, and colorfully un-Prussian
who had been sent from Alsace to join the 8th Army when mobilization was declared and now took the 1st of the steps by which he would establish himself as one of the war's master tacticians. Using a map and compass, Hoffmann showed Prittwitz that Samsonov's army was already closer to the Vistula River than the main German force, so that clean escape was no longer possible. He outlined a plan aimed not only at making withdrawal unnecessary but at defeating both Russian armies. 1st the Germans would strike again at Rennenkampf, who was still at Gumbinnen, apparently regrouping after the clash there. Finishing off Rennenkampf, Hoffmann calculated, would only a few days; at a minimum his army could be rendered incapable of pursuit. The Germans would then be free to deal with Samsonov.
His composure restored, Prittwitz agreed that there need be no retreat. He didn't, however, accept Hoffmann's plan without amendment. He decided to go after Samsonov without 1st attacking Rennenkampf. Speed was essential-everything depended on wrecking one of the invading armies before the 2 of them could combine into a single force too big to be coped with. Expecting his troops to deal with 2 big armies in just a few days, Prittwitz wisely decided, would be asking to much.
But in the excited rush to prepare, Prittwitz made 2 mistakes. He neglected to tell Hoffmann or anyone else on his staff of his conversation with Moltke-His announcement of a retreat-and after changing his mind he failed to inform Moltke that he had done so. Moltke continued to believe that the 8th Army was beginning to withdraw.
Fearful of the consequences if the 8th didn't stand and fight, Moltke looked about for a solution. And he thought of
who had been an important member of his planning staff until 1913 and was now the hero of Liege. " I know of no other man in whom I have such absolute trust," Moltke said. He sent orders for Ludendorff to join the 8th Army not as commanding officer-he was too young for that, too junior in rank, and definitely too much the parvenu commoner-but as chief of staff.
On his way east Ludendorff stopped at Koblenz to confer with Moltke, and the 2 agreed that the situation in East Prussia was not yet hopeless. When Ludendorff suggested attacking the Russian armies one by one before they could combine, Moltke agreed. That Hoffmann and Ludendorff came up with exactly the same idea, and that they had no difficulty in winning over Prittwitz and Moltke, is not as astonishing as it may seem. The German general staff had given much thought to the defense of East Prussia, had anticipated the arrival of Russian forces from 2 directions, and had planned accordingly. Ludendorff and Hoffmann were simply drawing upon established doctrine in making their proposals, and in giving their assent Moltke and Prittwitz were simply endorsing that same doctrine.
Before departing Koblenz, Ludendorff was taken to see Kaiser Wilhelm, receiving from him the Pour le Merite (Germany's highest military honor, higher than the Iron Cross, created and named by the Francophile Frederick the Great) and learning that a new commanding general of the 8th army had just been appointed. This was the 67 year old
who was being called out of retirement because of his reputation for steadiness and the fact that he, like Ludendorff, knew the complicated East Prussian terrain. Then Ludendorff was again on his way east, traveling in a special train, stopping along the way to pick up his wife so that she could join him for part of the trip. Hindedburg dressed in the outdated uniform in which he had ended his long career 2 years earlier, came aboard at Hanover at 4 a.m. The talked briefly-Ludendorff outlined the plan he had discussed with Moltke-and retired for a few hour's sleep.
Upon their arrival in East Prussia the next morning, they had much to do. Hindenburg had to tell Prittwitz, who happened to be his wife's cousin, that he was being put on the army's inactive list effective immediatley. Ludendorff meanwhile got a staff briefing. When Hoffmann outlined his plan and explained that it was already being put in motion, Ludendorrf of course approved it without change. The 2 knew each other well-had even lived in the same quarters for 4 years earlier in their careers. Despite being very different kinds of men, they respected each other's abilities. From the start they were able to work together easily.
The situation was challenging in the extreme, requiring the 8th Army to fight its own two-front war. Its complications began with the landscape of East Prussia, a region pocked with lakes and marshes and studded with woods and low hills, difficult for large armies to maneuver in, especially in the sectors nearest to Russia. Running north-south was a jumble of irregular-shaped bodies of water known as the Masurian Lakes. Rennenkampf's army was north of the lakes, Samsonov's south. They would have to move westward in order to unite.
Between them were the Germans, already west of the lakes and in position from which they could attack in either direction. They also had the advantage of knowing the terrain intimately-it was often setting for their annual maneuvers. And they had installed the rail lines needed for the execution of their plans.
It was obvious that the Russians should converge without delay. If they did so, the 8th Army was doomed. It was equally obvious that the Germans must proceed with extreme caution. If they attacked one of the Russian armies, they would have to leave enough troops behind to protect themselves from an advance by the other. It was far from clear that they had enough troops to do both things.
